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Optimal Stock Trading with Personal Taxes: Implications
For Prices and the Abnormal January Returns
ABSTRACT
The tax law confers upon the investor a timing option--to realize capital
losses and defer capital gains. With the tax rate on long term capital gains
and losses being about half the short term rate, the tax law provides a second
timing option--to realize capital losses short term and realize capital gains
long term, if at all. Our theory and simulation with actual stock prices over
the 1962—1977 period establish that the second timing option is extremely
valuable: Taxable investors should realize their long term capital gains in
high variance stocks and repurchase the same or similar stock, in order to
reestablishthe short—term status and realize potential future losses short
term.
Tax trading does not explain the positive abnormal returns of small
firms. Inthepresence of transactions costs, tax trading predicts that the
volumeof tax—loss selling increases from January to December and ceases in
the first few days of January. The trading volume seasonal maps into a stock
price seasonal only if tax—loss sellers are assumed irrational or ignorant of
the price seasonality.
Proc. George M. Constantinides
Graduate School of Business
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1101East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 606371 •INTRODUCTION
Capital gains and losses are taxed when the investor sells the stock——not
when gains and losses actually occur. Suppressing the distinction between the
short term tax rate on capital gains and losses and the long term rate, the
optimal trading policy is to realize capital losses immediately and defer
capital gains, thereby reducing the present value of the stream of tax
payments on capital gains net of tax credits on capital losses.
Constantinides (1983) formally derives the optimal trading policy, estimates
the value of this timing option as a fraction of the stock price, and finds
the effective tax rate on capital gains and on dividends. He also explains
how the capital gains tax influences the investor's optima], consumption and
investment program and derives the equilibrium pricing implications--how the
capital gains tax modifies the asset pricing models of Breeden (1979), Brennan
(1973) and Merton (1973).
With the tax rate on long term capital gains and losses being about half
the rate on short term capital gains and losses, the tax law confers upon the
investor a second timing option——to realize losses short term and realize
gains long term, if at all. For those investors who can draw the distinction
between the two tax rates, the second option is substantially more valuable
than the first one. Suppose that the investor bought the stock exactly one
year ago. If the stock price has declined, he optimally sells the stock and
repurchases it, realizing a short term capital loss immediately. If the stock
price has increased instead, the investor optimally defers the realization of
a short term capital gain and one day later faces two alternatives. First, he
may defer the realization of the long term gain. Second, he may sell the
stock and repurchase it, realizing a long term gain and reestablishing the2
favorableshort term status, in order to realize future capital losses at the
short term rate.
Our theory, based on the option pricing argumentofBlack and Scholes
(1973), confirms that under broad conditions the investor ought to realize a
long term gain in order to reestablish the short term status. These
conditions apply to high variance stocks and even to medium variance stocks,
if transactions costs are low and the interest rate is low (see, Tables 1 and
2). The results are intuitively appealing. The timing option to realize
losses short term and gains long term is more valuable the higher the stock
variance, for essentially the same reason that a call option is more valuable
the higher the stock variance. Thus the higher the stock variance the
strongerthe incentive to reestablish the short term status even at the
expense of the tax on long term gains. Also, the lower the interest rate the
higher the present value of the future tax benefit of this option.
Transactions costs inhibit trading but the order of magnitude of the potential
tax benefit is large relative to even substantial transactions costs.
We simulate three active tax trading policies and the buy—and-hold policy
for alarge sample of NYSE— and AMEX—listed stocks over the period 1962—
1977. The performanceunder optimal trading far exceeds the performance under
thebuy—and—holdpolicy (see, Table 3and Figures 1, 2, and 3). Thetax
trading benefit is large even when we allow for long term gains to offset
short term losses dollar for dollar. The results readily translate into an
annual tax subsidy which the government provides to taxable investors under
various provisions of the tax law.
We relate our findings to theempiricalevidence onpositiveabnormal
returns by small firms, and positive abnormal returns in the month of
January. We argue that tax trading not only fails to explain, but exacerbates3
thesmall firm anomaly, and cast doubts on a proposed explanation based on
transactions costs. Regarding the Januaryanomaly,we find that tax-loss
selling predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume, provided transactions
costs are present. Tax—loss selling predicts a seasonal pattern in stock
prices, only if we further assume irrationality or ignorance of the stock
price seasonality on behalf of investors.
Thepaper is organized as follows: The tax environment is discussed in
Section 2.In Section 3 we derive those properties of the optimal trading
policy which do not depend on detailed assumptions on the stock price
distribution(see, Propositions 1and 2). In Section 4we assume that the
stock price follows a binomial process and provide coyiditions under which it
isoptimal to incur the cost of realizing a long term gain in order to
reestablish the tax—advantageous short term status (see, Proposition 3). The
conclusions are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 for a range of parameter
values.Section 5 reports the simulation of the trading policies. In Section
6 we relate our findings to the empirical evidence on the small firm anomaly
and the January anomaly. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7.
2. THE TAX ENVIRONMENT
Unrealized capital gains and losses are not taxed. Realized capital
gains and losses are short term if the asset has been held for one year or
less, and long term otherwise. Net short term capital gains (or losses),
are defined as the total short term capital gains net of total short term
capital losses, including unused short term carryovers. Net long term capital
gains (or losses), XL, are defined as the total long term capital gains net
of total long term capital losses, including unused long term carryovers. If
From 1942 to 1976 the holding period was six months. In 1977 it was
increased to nine months, and in 1978 it was increased to one year.4
both X and XL are nonnegative, short term capital gains are taxed at the
individual's marginaltaxrate on ordinary income; and long term capital gains
are taxed at 40% (until October 1979, 50%) of the individual's marginal tax
2,3/
rate on ordinary income. If bothXand XL are nonpositive, then net
short term capital losses and 50% of net long term capital losses are
deductiblefrom ordinary income. These deductions mayjointly decrease the
4/ taxableordinary income by a maximum of $3,000 per tax year. Unused capital
lossesare carried forward indefinitely.
A complication of the tax code is that net short term losses offset net
long term gains one to one. Thus, ifX < 0 < XLand Xg +XL<0,the
loss X+XListaxed as short term; ifX < 0 < XL andX +XL> 0,the
gainX +XLis taxed as long term. Likewise, if XL < 0 < X and
X +XL< 0, the loss X +XLis taxed as long term; if XL < 0 < X and
X +XL> 0, thegain X ÷XLis taxed as short term.
If an asset is soldat a loss and repurchased within thirty days, the IRS
terms the transaction a "wash sale" and disallows the loss deduction. The
investor has a high probability to circumvent this rule by waiting thirty days
before repurchasing the same asset. A safer way to circumvent the rule is to
repurchase a different asset with the same risk and return characteristics.
In any case, the wash sale provision does not apply to dealers or individuals
who are in the business of trading stocks.
2/—Priorto 1969 the maximum rate on long term capital gains was 25% even
to investors in tax brackets above 50%. In 1969—1976 (1976—1979) the marginal
tax rate on capital gains above the first $50,000 was as high as 421/2% (49%).
3/
Upon the investor's death the assets' basis is adjusted to market.
Effectively realized and unrealized capital gains and losses remain untaxed.
4/
Until 1976 the deduction limit was $1,000. It was increased to $2,000
in 1977 and to $3,000 thereafter.5
3, PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL TRADING POLICY
An investor maysellstock to invest the proceeds in relatively
underpriced assets, consume, or rebalance his portfolio. We consider those
times at which the investor is not motivated by any of the above reasons to
sell stock and investigate the conditions under which he would optimally sell
5/
stock and repurchase it for tax reasons. We defer the discussion of
transactions costs until Section 4.3.
Thereare at least three representative tax scenarios. In the first one
the investor is a tax-exempt institution or an individual who continually
carries forward large capital losses and expects the deduction limit to remain
bindingfor many years. Themarginal tax rate oncap,ital gains and losses is
zero and the investor pays no attention to the realization of capital gains
and losses in pursuing his optimal investment policy.
In the second scenario the deduction limit is not binding and short term
and long term capital gains and losses are taxed at the same rate. This
scenario is plausible if (1) the individual investor is periodically forced to
sell some of his assets by factors beyond his control and, on average,
realizes large long term gains; and (2) he can defer the realization of short
term capital gains until the holding period exceeds one year and then realize
the capital gains long term. Then short term and long term capital losses
simply offset some of the long term capital gains. The optimal trading policy
is derived in Constantinides (1983) and is restated here for completeness.
PROPOSITION 0: Assume that transactions costs are zero and the tax rate on
long term capital gains and losses equals the tax rate on short term capital
5/
Holt and Shelton (1962) discuss the investor's trade—off between the
benefit of switching to relatively underpriced assets and the cost of the
capital gains tax.6
gains and losses. Then at any time that the investor is not forced to sell
the stock, he optimally realizes losses and repurchases the stock; and defers
the realization of gains.
In the third scenario we focus on the distinction between the short term
and the long term tax status. We assume that short term capital gains and
losses are taxed at the rate t,andlong term capital gains and losses are
6,2/
taxed at the lower rate TL. We examine the optimal trading policy under
the simplifying assumption that trading occurs in discrete, one-year
intervals. The length of the trading period conveniently coincides with the
length of the holding period beyond which short term capital gains and losses
become long term. If an asset is sold one year after purchase, the capital
gain or loss is short term or long term at the investor's discretion.
Obviously the investor delays the sale by at least one day if he has a short
term capital gain, but not if he has a short term capital loss. Propositions
1 and 2 state some properties of the optimal trading policy which are free
from distributional assumptions on the stock price.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that trading occurs inone—yearintervals only,
transactionscosts are zero, and the tax rate on long term capital gains and
6/
If the investor does not have short term gains, he offsets short term
losses against long term gains one to one and, effectively, cannot use to his
advantage the distinction between the short term and the long term tax
status. This complication is suppressed here and discussed later in
Section5.4.
7/We suppress the distinction between the tax rate on net long term
gains,TL(net gains) =.4t,and the tax rate on net long term losses,
TL(net losses) =.5t.This is justified because long term losses offset some
ofthe long term gains and the marginal tax rate on long term losses equals
the marginal taxrate on long term gains.
In any case, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 remain valid if the condition
T(margina1 gain) =T(marginalloss) < Tisreplaced by the pair of weaker
conditions, T(margir1al gain) <'rand T(marginal loss) < t.7
losses is less than the tax rate on short term capital gains and losses, i.e.,
TL<T.Then, at any time that the investor is not forced to sell the stock,
he optimally:
a.Defers the realization of a short term gain.
b. Sells the stock and repurchases it to realize a loss, short term if
possible.
c. Sells the stock and repurchases it to change the long term status to
shortterm, whenever thestock price is equal to the basisandthe
status is long term.
Proof:
a. Realizing the gain long term one year and one day after purchase dominates
the policy of realizing the gain short term one year after purchase. This
proves (a).
b. Suppose that the stock was purchased longer than one year ago with cost
basis p0 and the stock price now is < If the investor does
nothing now and sells the stock at time T, T > t,theafter-tax proceeds
are(1 —T)P + T P L TLO
Weshow that the active policy of realizing the loss at time tand
repurchasing the stock dominates the above policy. In selling the stock at
time t the investor receive a tax rebate t(P —P)which he invests in a LO t
risklessbond with after-tax annual return R, R > 1. Thebasis of the stock
is and the status is short term. AttimeT he sells the stock and the
bond. The after—tax proceeds are at least (1 -
TL)PT+TLt+ RTtT(P —




— >0.If the investor dies at time T and the
effective tax rate becomes zero, the proceeds of the optimal policy exceed the
proceeds of the passive policy by at least R t(P - >0.
Next suppose that the stock was purchased just one year ago. By the
above argument, realizing a long term loss (by waiting one day before selling
the stock) dominates the passive policy. Also realizing the loss short term
dominates the policy of realizing it long term. This proves (b).
c.The short term status dominates the long term status. With the short
term status, ifcapital gains are realized in thefuture, they are realized
longterm irrespective of thecurrentstatus;ifcapital losses are realized
one period hence, they are realized short term. Therefore the investor
switches to the short term status whenever he can do so costlessly. This
proves (c).
An investor holds a share of stock with price P, purchased t periods
ago at cost basis p. We introduce the concept of the value of a stock
position, v(P, P, t). At the time that the investor purchases the stock, the
A A A A
valueof the position is P,i.e., V(P, P, 0) =P.If the stockpricefalls
one year later, the investor optimally realizes a short term loss (see, Proposition
1) and the value of the position is v(P, P1 1) =(1—T)P+TP, pp If
the stock price rises t years after purchase, the optimal policy may be to
realize the long term gain, in which case v(P, p.t) =(1-
TL)P+ TLP, or
todefer it, in which case V(P, P, t) > (1 —TL)P+ At those times
that v(P, P, t) > (1 — +TLPI the value of a stock position is not a
market price because the investor may not sell the stock and transfer the
unrealized capital gain to the buyer.
8/
Wesay at least, because ifT =t+1and T < theloss
realizedat time T is short term and (1—+ t > — TL)PT +TLPt•9
A
Wedefine the value of a stockposition,v(P, p, t), as the after—tax
shadow price, such that the investor is indifferent betweenhaving the stock
A * withbasispand age t, or having v(P,P,t) after-tax dollars.
A
Thefunction v(P, P, t) is convex in P. It is also homogeneous of
degree one in (P, P), under the additional assumption that the distribution
of the stock return, T't' at time t is independent of theprice 't
These two properties imply that V(P, p, t) is convex in P. (The above
three statements are proved in Appendix 1.) Thelatterproperty leads to a
partialcharacterization of the optimal trading policy when the price exceeds
the basis and the stock has been held for at least oneyear.
PROPOSITIoN 2: Under the assumptions of Proposition1, if itis optimal to
realizea long term gain when P =hp,h > 1,then itis also optimal to
A A realizea long term gain for all P, PP hP.
Proof:If it is optimal to realize a long term gain when P =hP,then
(1) V(h;, P, t) =(1—
TL)hP+tLP
By Proposition 1,
(2) v(P, P, t) =P. t 1
Since V is convex in its first argument (see, Appendix 1, Lemma 3),
equations (1) and (2) imply
(3) V(P, P, t) (1 —tL)P+
TLP
, P'P< hP ,t 1
But
(4) V(P, P, t) (1 — +
•tLP,t 110
sincethe investor has the option to sell the stock and realize a long term
gain. Combining equations (3) and (4) we obtain
(5) v(P,P, t)=(1-
TL)P+TLPI P (P< hP,t) 1
This proves the claim and completes the proof.
In the next section we assume that the stock price follows a binomial
process and provide conditions under which it isoptimal to realize a long
termgain. When these conditions are violated, it is optimal to defer all
long term (and short term) gains.
4. THE OPTIMAL TRADING POLICY IN A BINOMIAL MODEL OF STOCK PRICES
4.1Introduction
We assume that the annual stock prices, Pt t+i ...,aregenerated by
a binomial process as follows:
=uP,with probability 1 -q
Pt -1 = uP, with probability q
where u is constant over time and is greater than one. No dividends are
paid on the stock. Transactions costs are zero. The investor is infinitely
9/
lived and he is never forced to realize a capital gain or loss.
There exists a single—period riskiess asset with after—tax interest




The conclusion in this section is that the investor should optimally
realize a long term capital gain or a short term capital loss in every period
on medium and high variance stocks. This conclusion remains valid if we allow
for forced realizations, provided that the investor is not forced to realize
capital gains short term.11
is necessary, if the after—tax cash flows of the risky and the riskless asset
donot dominate one another:
(6) u1 < R < u
Inthe remainder of the introduction we assume that the tax rate onshort
termcapital gains and losses, t,equalsthe tax rate on long term capital
gains and losses. We state some known results which we employ in Section 4.2
to characterize the optimal trading policy when there is a distinction between
the short term and long term status.
With the two tax rates being equal, the value of a stock position is
independentof the time period that the stockhasbeeji held, and we write
V(P, P) without the argument t. The optimal policy, as stated in





The functional form of V(P, P) is derived in Constantinides (1983) under the
assumption that the logarithm of the stock price follows a Wiener process with
drift. A similar derivation (see, Appendix 2) under the assumption that the









Thefollowingproposition completes the characterization of an optimal
policy.
PROPOSITION 3:Assume that trading occurs in one-year intervals only; there
are no forced realizations; the stock price is generated by a binomial process
with U1 < RU; there are no dividends; transactions costs are zero; and
the tax rate on long term capital gains and losses is less than or equal to




at any time that P > uP, it is optimal to defer the gain.
b. If
Lu-R tuR—1'
at any time that P =uP,it is optimal to realize the gain, and
1 0/
realize it long term.
10/
Under this policy we leave unspecified the action when P > uP
because thi contingency never arises: Before P > uP, the price will have
equalled uP at some earlier period, a long term capital gain will have been
realized, and the basis will have been updated.
This argument hinges on our earlier assumption that the stock price can
increase by only one step each year. If, instead, the stock price were
generated by a trinomial process, P4 =uPor uP or u2P, then we
would have to consider separately three candidate policies:
(a) Defer a gain if PuP.
(b) Realize a gain if P =uPbut defer a gain if P > u2P.
(c) Realize a gain if PuP.
Our discussion following Table 1 in this section suggests that our conclusions
do not critically depend on the binomial process.13
Proof:By Proposition 2, when the stock price exceeds the basis, an optimal
policy is either to defer all gains, or to defer short term gains and realize
long term gains.
Assume,for the sake of the argument, that the optimal policy isto defer
all gains. Since only losses are realized, and are always realized short
term,the value of a position, V(P, P, t),is independent of the longterm
rate.In particular, the value of a position is given by equation (8), which
was obtained under the assumption that short term and long term gains and
losses are taxed at the same rate,r. Since,byassumption, it is optimal to
defer the gain when P =uP,we impose the condition
(12) V(uP, P, t) > (1.L)U; +TLP
,t) 1.
Equations (8), (9) and (12) imply, after tedious manipulations, equation
(10). If equation (10) is violated the optimal policy is to realize a long
term gain when P =up.This completes the proof.
If the short term and long term tax ratesare equal, then
L' =>Cu —R)/(uR—1)and it is optimal to defer a long term gain. For
sufficiently low long term tax rate relative to the short term rate, it is
optimal to realize long term gains. The function (u —R)/(uR—1)is
decreasing in R. For a sufficiently high interest rate condition (10) is
satisfied and the optimal policy is to defer a long term gain because the
future benefits associated with the short term tax status become less
valuable. The function (U- R)/(u.R—1)is increasing in u. For
sufficiently high value of u condition (10) is violated and the optimal
policy is to realize a long term gain. The higher u is, the larger the
variance of the stock return. Thus it is optimal to. realize long term gains
on high variance stocks but not on low variance stocks.14




and the conditional variance, a2, is
(13') a2 =var(9n(Pt+i/Pt)IPt]
=4q(1—q)(Lnu)2
We eliminate q from equations (13) and (13') and obtain
22
(14) u
In Table 1 we report u (in brackets) and the critical tax ratio,
(u —R)/(uR—1),for a range of the parameters ii, a and R. If the tax
ratio, tL/T is belowthecritical ratio, the optimal policy is to realize
long term capital gains; otherwise the optimal policy is to defer long term
and short term gains. The range of a is representative of the stocks listed
on the NYSE and AMEX, with the median being about a =.40per year. With
the ratio TL/T=.4andwith the tax-exempt, annual interest rate taken to
be5%, the first panel states that the investorshould sell the stock and
repurchaseit at the end of every year and realize a short term loss or a long
term gain, whatever the case may be. The second panel, with the tax—exempt
annual interest rate taken to be 10%, states that the investor should refrain
fromrealizing long term gains infew cases, marked in the table with an
asterisk.These cases refer to stocks with verylow variance (the bottom 25%
ofall NYSE and AMEX listed stocks) and expected rate of return loweror equal
totheexpectedrate of return on riskless tax—exempt bonds. We conclude
that, at least in the absence of transactions costs, theinvestoroptimally
sells the stock and repurchases iteveryyear.15
Our conclusion may be criticized on the grounds that it is specific to
the assumed binomial process. For example the entry in Table 1 with
R =1.05, ji= .05and a =.40is u =1.50and the critical ratio of tax
rates is .78. That is, provided the ratio is less than .78, if the
stock price is 1.50 times the basis one year after purchase, the investor
optimally realizes a long term gain. Suppose, however, that the stock price
follows a different stochastic process so that one year after purchase it
could be any multiple of the basis. It does not necessarily follow that the
investor optimally realizes a long term gain, however large the gain may be.
An investor realizes a long term gain, however large the gain may be (within
the context of the binomial model), provided
(15) v(P, P, t) (1 —tL)P+t1:;, V




The entries in Table 1 with a dagger signify the stocks for which the investor
optimally realizes a long term gain, however large that gain may be, in order
to reestablish the short term status, when the ratio of the tax rates is 'tL/t
=.40.We conclude that, in the absence of transactions costs, the investor
optimally realizes a long term gain on medium and high variance stocks,
however large the gain may be.
4.3 Proportional Transactions Costs
With proportional transactions costs the optimal policy is complex. We
simply assume that transactions costs are small so that it is plausible to
limit our attention to the two policies which are optimal in the absence of
transactions costs. As in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we first assume that it is16
optimal to defer gains. We then state conditions on the parameters such that
this policydominates the policy of realizing long term gains.
Theone—way proportional transactions costs rate is y, where
a A
oy 1 •Whenthe stock price is P, the investor pays(1 +y)Pto buy
one share, i.e.,
A
(17) V(P, (1 +y)P,0) =(1+ y)P
If thepricefalls to uP, the investor realizes a short term loss, and
receives, net of taxandtransactions costs,
A A A A
(18) V(u P, (1 +y)P,1) =(1—r)(1—y)uP +r(1 + y)P
-I
Ifthe price first rises, by assumption, the investor defers the gain; if the
price first rises and then falls to the level of the purchase price, the
investor sells the stock to reestablish the short term status, i.e.,
v(P, (1 +y)P, t) =(1—TL)(l
-y)P+TL(l + y)P,P =P,t ) 1
(19)
>(1
— — y)P+ tLl + y)P,P > P, t 1
.sin Appendix 2, but now with proportional transactions costs, we compare
portfolioswith different bases and obtain the following:
(20)V(P,(1+ y)P, t) =R1U1
—k)V(uP,(1 +y)P, t + 1)+kV(u1P, (1 + y)P, t + 1)
where
(21) k17
We combine equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) and obtain
(1 + > R((1 —k){(1—t)(l—y)u+ L + y)}
(22)
+ k((1 —r)(1—y)u1P+ t(1 + y)P}J
Using equation (21) we eliminate k from equation (22) and obtain
(23)
L (u —R){(1+ y)u —(1-y)}—2(u-u1)uRy/t
(uR —1){1—y)u—(1+ y)}
Note that, in the absence of transactions costs, equation (23) becomes
1/
Cu—R)/(uR—1),which is the earlier equation (10).
In Table 2 we assume 4% round—trip transactions costs rate, i.e.,
2 =.04and 50% short term tax rate. We report u (in brackets) and
the critical tax ratio (i.e., the right—hand side ofequation (23)) for a
range of the parameters1.1, a and R. If the tax ratio, T/t, is below the
critical ratio, the optimal policy is to realize long term capital gains
when P =u;otherwise, the optimal policy is to defer long term and short
term gains. With the ratio =.40,and with the tax—exempt annual
interest rate taken to be either 5% or 10%, Table 2 indicates that the
investor should sell the stock and repurchase it annually to realize a short
term loss or long term gain on all high variance stocks, a.60. The
investor should do the same annually on medium variance stocks(a =.40)
also,iftransactions costs are negligible but not if they are substantial.
11/—Stolland Whaley (1983) estimate the round—trip transactions costs as
thesum of the bid—asked spread and the minimum commission schedule provided
in the NYSE Fact Book until 1974, the last year of fixed commissions. For
1960—1979, they find the average round-trip transactions costs to be 6.77% for
the largest decile NYSE—listed stocks, and 2.71% for the smallest decile NYSE—
listed stocks. These estimates exaggerate the transactions costs applicable
to medium size and large investors: First, negotiated commissions are
small. Second, sophisticated investors, who can wait a few days before they
executea trade, need not have the full bid—asked spread work against them.
Analyzing215,000 individual tickets on over $27 billion of equity trades by
thirteen organizations in 1978 and 1979, Beebower and Surz (1980) conclude
that the average round—trip transactions costs rate is less than 1% f or each
one of these organizations.18
(Compare Tables 1 and 2.) These conclusions are supported by the simulation
reported in the next section.
5. SIMULATING TRADING POLICIES WITH
ACTUAL STOCK PRICES, 1962-1977
5.1 Introduction
We simulate three trading policies over the fifteen year period, 1962-
1977, and compare their performance against the buy—and-hold policy. We start
in 1962, the first year covered by the University of Chicago's CRSP Daily
Stock Master file. The investment in each stock is made on December 3, 1962,
and trading in future years occurs only once every year at the beginning or
middle of December. (The description of the tradThg policies explains how
the exact trading day is chosen.)
We assume that the 1982 tax law was in force over the simulation
period. The simulation then predicts the future effectiveness of theactive
trading policies under the current taxlaw,if the price fluctuations in the
1962—1977 period are representative of the future. The holding period beyond
which short term capital gains and losses become long term is taken to be one
year instead of six or nine months (which was the statutorytime interval in
the 1962-1977 period). The marginal tax rate on ordinary income and on short
term capital gains and losses is taken to be 50%. The marginal tax rate on
long term capital gains and losses is taken to be 20%. The limit onthe
12/With individual investors' capital gains and losses taxed only once
everyyear, investors have an incentive to realize their lossesin December
instead of the following January and defer their gains from December to the
followingJanuary. The implied trading volume seasonality is discussedin
Section 6.2 in connection with the January stock return anomaly.
A referee suggested that we simulate a policy in which losses are
realized in December and gains are realized in January. We discuss this
policy in Section 5.4 as policy V and argue that it is practicallyindis—
tinguishable from policy III which we simulate.19
capitalloss deduction from ordinary income is assumed nonbinding. This
assumptionS overestimates the effectiveness of the active policies.
The sample includes all securities which were on the CRSP Daily Stock
Market file as of December 3, 1962, and remained on file until December
1977. Of the 2,027 securities on file on December 3, 1962, only 1,147
remained on file until December 1977, and qualify for inclusion in the
sample. In a merger, reorganization, or exchange, if a security on file is
replaced by another security on file until December 1977, then the security is
included in the sample. If a security is delisted from the NYSE and
immediatelyrelisted onthe AMEX (or vice versa), the security is included in
thesample,provided it is on file until December 1977. Finally, suspension
oftrading by the SEC or halting of trading by the exchange for more than one
year disqualifies a security for inclusion in the sample.
Thehighest variance stocks are the ones most likely to be delisted from
the NYSE or AMEX. Our exclusion from the sample of all stocks not
continuously listed over the 15-year simulation period eliminates from the
sample many high variance stocks. Furthermore, the highest variance stocks
are likely to be small firms traded over-the—counter and therefore exclUded
from the sample. The selection procedure eliminates manyhighvariance stocks
for which the active trading policies work best.
By eliminating stocks which the investor would be forced to sell before
the completion of the 15—year period, the selection procedure overestimates
the effectiveness of the policy of deferring gains throughout the 15—year
period (policy I) but not of the policy of realizing all gains and losses in
13/—Beforeexclusion, 40% of the stocks are classified as high variance,
30% as medium variance, and 30% as low variance. After eliminating the stocks
not continuously listed over the 15-year period, 32% of the remaining stocks
are in the high variance group, 32% in the medium variance group, and 37% in
the low variance group.20
every year (policy II). The selection procedure only slightly overestimates
the effectiveness of the poiicy of realizing gains in alternate years (policy
III).
All securities on the CRSP file are classified by CRSP into ten port-
folios with equal number of securities, based on the variance of the daily
excess return in 1962. Portfolio one includes the securities with the highest
variance and portfolio ten includes those with the lowest. We classify the
sample of 1,147 securities into three groups as follows: 367 high variance
stocks with CRSP variance classification 1—4; 361 medium variance stocks with
CRSP variance classification 5—7; and 419 low variance stocks with CRSP
variance classification 8—10. We do not reclassify the stocks into groups in
subsequent years although their CRSP variance classification may change
annually.
One hundred dollars are invested in each stock on December 3, 1962. The
number of purchased shares is maintained constant throughout the 15—year
period, adjusted only for stock splits, stock dividends, mergers, reorganiza-
tions and exchanges. Cash dividends, partial liquidations, and cash proceeds
from selling rights are not used to repurchase stock. These cash distribu-
tions are taxed at the marginal tax rate of 50%, if appropriate, and are
deposited each December in a cash fund that we associate with each stock and
14/—Annualreclassification of stocks by variance would be meaningless in
our simulation because we compare the performance of the active policies
against a policy of buying the stock and holding it over 15 years. One of the
conclusions derived from the simulation is that the active trading policies
work best for high variance stocks. This conclusion would be reinforced if
the simulation was done with stocks which not only had high variance in 1962
but which maintained high variance throughout the 15-year period.21
for each policy. The cash fund is invested each December in one—year
Treasury bills, with the interest earned on the Treasury bills being taxed at
50% and reinvested until December 1977. If a capital loss is realized on the
stock, the tax rebate is also deposited in this fund. If a capital gain is
realized on the stock, the tax due is subtracted from the fund. The balance
of the cash fund maybepositive or negative. In December 1977 this balance
is added to the after—tax proceeds from selling the stock.
5.2 Policy I:Realize Losses in Every December and Defer Gains
One hundred dollars are invested in the stock on December 3, 1962. One
1 6/
year later, on December 3, 1963, we observe the stock price. If the stock
,
hasa capital gain, we defer it. If the stock has a capital loss, we sell the
stock, realize the loss short term and deposit the tax rebate in the cash fund
associated with the stock. On the following trading day we repurchase the
same number of shares. We repeat the procedure each December until 1977.
In Decembers after 1963 a capital loss is realized short term only if the
stock was last sold and repurchased in the previous December; otherwise any
loss realized is long term.ifl December 1977 the stock is sold and a capital
gain or loss is realized.(The capital gain can always be realized long term
by waiting one more day before selling the stock.) The cash fund, which has
15/
For example, the cash distributions between December 3, 1962, and the
next trading date in December 1963 are held, earning no interest, until the
December 1963 trading date. At that time they are deposited in one—year
Treasury bills.
1 6/
If this date is not a valid trading date, we observe the stock price
on the last trading date on which capital losses qualify for short term
status.
17/—Ifthe number of shares in the active trading policy were not kept
constant, the comparison of after tax cash values of the active and buy—and—
hold policies would be meaningless because a different amount of risk would be
associated with each policy.22
the after—tax cash distributions and tax rebates with interest, is added to
the after—tax proceeds from selling the stock. The sum is the net proceeds in
year 1977 under policy I.
Under the buy—and—hold, one hundred dollars are invested in the stock on
December3, 1962. On the same date in December 1977 that the stock is sold
under policy I, the stock is sold under the buy-and-hold. Capital gains or
losses are realized long term. The cash fund associated with this policy and
which has the after-tax cash distributions with interest, is added to the
after—tax proceeds from selling the stock. The sum is the net proceeds in
year 1977 under the buy—and—hold.
The ratio XI/XBH of the net proceeds of policy I and the buy—and—hold
is a measure of their relative performance. Adjustment for risk is
unnecessary in this comparison because the number of shares is held constant
in both policies. In Table 3 and in Figure 1 we report this ratio for the
three variance groups of stocks with zero transactions costs and with 4%
round—trip transactions costs. Referring to Figure 1, in the absence of
transactions costs the wealth relatives are never less than one because policy
Idominates the buy-and—hold. Policy I outperforms the buy—and-hold by a
greater margin for high variance stocks than for medium or low variance
stocks. The option to realize losses and defer gains is more valuable for
high variance stocks than for medium or low variance stocks.
18/
An alternative measure of their relative performance,(X1 —100)/(XBH
-100),exaggerates the benefit of the active policy for stocks that have low
realized return over the simulation period, i.e., XBH 100.
19/
This statement is correct only to a firstapproximation. By analogy,
aportfolio consisting of a call option and a bondpaying off the exercise
priceat the option's maturity, has the same risk as a share of stockonly to
a first approximation. There is no practical way to refine the adjustment for
risk in our simulation or even estimate the direction of bias.23
Thesuperiority of policy I over the buy-and-hold is modest. For the
group of high variance stocks the median wealth ratio of policy I and the buy—
and—hold is 1.043 with zero transactions costs, and 1.016 with 4%round—trip
transactions costs. In policy II the investor realizes even long term gains
in order to reestablish the tax—advantageous short term status. Aswe shall
see,this policy pays off handsomely.
5.3Policy II: Realize Gains and Losses in Every December
One hundred dollars are invested in the stock on December 3,1962.One
yearlater, on December 3, 1963, we observe the stock price. If the stock has
a capital loss we realize itshortterm and repurchase the same number of
shareson the following trading day. We deposit the tax rebate in the cash
fund associated with the stock. If, instead, the stock has a capital gain, we
wait until the following trading day. If the stock still has a capital gain,
we realize it long term and repurchase the same number of shares on the
followingtrading day. The capital gains tax is paid out of the cash fund
associated with the stock. We repeat the procedure until 1977. In December
1977the stock is sold. The after—tax proceeds plus the balance of the cash
fund is the net proceeds under policy II. Under the buy—and—hold, one hundred
dollars are invested in thestockonDecember3,1962.On the same date in
December1977 that the stock is sold under policy II, the stock is sold under
the buy-and—hold. The after-tax proceeds plus the balance of the cash fund is
the net proceeds under the buy—and—hold.
The ratioof the net proceeds under policy IIand the buy—and—hold is
reportedinTable 3 and Figure 2. The performance of policy II is spectacular
for high and medium variance stocks, even with 4% round-trip transactions
costs. Updatingthe basis yearly and reestablishing the short termstatus is
far more profitablethan the policy of realizing losses and deferring gains.24
Theresults are in agreement with the theoretical prediction ofSection 4 and
Tables 1 and 2.
The optimal policy, as discussed in Section 4, is to realizegains long
term, provided the ratio of the stock price to the basis is belowsome
critical number. It is only for stocks which satisfyequation (16) and which
are marked with a dagger in Table 1 that the optimal policy is to realizea
gain, however large itmaybe. In policy II gains are realized however large
they may be. Therefore, the results underestimate the effectiveness ofa more
sophisticated policy of deferring large gains on low variance stocks.
Under the assumption that the holding period for long termcapital gains
and losses is six months (as was indeed the case in heyears1962—1976)
instead of one year, policy II is dominated by the policy ofrealizing all
capital gains long term and all capital losses short termevery December and
June.(This statement is true even though short term losses andlong term
gains incurred in the sameyear offset each other one to one.) Therefore
policy II underestimates the effectiveness of a more sophisticatedpolicy
applicable in the years 1962—1976.
In a different sense policy II overestimates the benefits of tax
trading. If the investor applies policy II to a portfolio of assets (instead
of a single asset), each year he typically realizes short term losseson some
stocks and long term gains on others. The offsetting of gains and losses
undermines the effectiveness of policy II. The next policy isdesigned to
overcomethis problem.
5.4Policy III: Realize Gains inAlternateDeceabers and
Realize Losses in Every December
One hundred dollars are invested inthestock on December 3, 1962. In
Decembers of odd years gains are deferred and losses are realized, shortterm
ifpossible.In odd years the problemof oneto one offsetting between short25
term losses and long term gains does not arise because no gains are
realized.In Decembers of even years both gains and losses are realized.
Gains are realized long term. The investor may be able to realize the losses
short term provided the asset was last purchased one year ago, and there are
no realized long term gains on other assets to offset the short term gain one
to one. We cannot ascertain whether the investor has realized long term gains
on other assets in the same year without having observed the realized returns
on all of the portfolio assets. In policy III we simply assume that all
losses realized in even years (but not in odd years) are realized long term.
This assumption being conservative, policy III underestimates the
effectiveness of the optimal policy.
On December1977the stock is sold. The after-tax proceeds plus the
balance of the cash fund is the net proceeds under policy III. On the same
date in December 1977 that the stock is sold under policy III, thestock is
sold under the buy-and—hold. The after-tax proceeds plus the balance of the
cash fund is the proceeds under the buy—and—hold.
The ratio of the net proceeds under policy III and the buy-and-hold is
reportedin Table 3and Figure 3. Even though policy III exaggerates the
adverse effect of tax offsetting between short term losses and long term
gains, it substantially outperforms the buy—and—hold for all categories of
stocks. Even with 4% round—trip transactions costs, policy III outperforms
the buy—and—hold for high variance and some medium variance stocks.
A variant of policy III, which we may call policy IV, is to defer gains
and realize losses,preferably short term, in odd years. Sofar the policy is
the same as policy III. But in policy IV, in even years gains are realized
long term and losses are deferred. This differs from policy III in that in
policy III losses are realized long term in even years. A momentts reflection
should convince the reader that policy III dominates policy IV in the absence26
oftransactions costs. In the presence of transactions costspolicy III does
not dominate policy IV because it involves more frequent transactions.
Simulations not reported here confirm that, in the absence of transactions
costs, policy III dominates policy IV. With 4% round—trip transaction costs
policy III still outperforms policy IV.
Yet another variant of policy III, which we may call policy V, is to
realizelosses, preferably short term, every December; and realize long term
gainsonly on the Januaries of odd years (instead of realizing them onthe
Deceersof even years). An upper bound on the performance of this policy is
obtainedby replacing the tax rate on longterm gains in policy III by
r/(1+ r), where r is the interest rate; and leaving the tax rates on
long term and short term losses unchanged. We concludethat policy V isonly
marginallysuperior to policy III.
5.5 The Timing option
Inbuying stock, a taxable investor obtains a timing option on the
realization ofcapital gains and losses. The option is utilized under the
optimal trading policy but is wasted under the naive buy—and—hold policy.
Suppose that one hundred dollars invested in stock become XBH dollars after
tax in fifteen years under the buy—and-hold and X0 under theoptimal
policy. If XO/XBH =2we say that the timing option represents fifty
dollarsof the initial investment. More generally, we say that the timing
option represents fraction1 -XBH/XOof the initial investment. The timing
option provides an alternative interpretation of Table 3. For example, for
high variance stocks and trading policy III, the timing option represents, on
average,fraction 1 —1/1.747=.43of the original investment without
transactionscosts, or fraction1 —1/1.359=.26with 4% round—trip
transactions costs.27
6.EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
6.1The Abnormal Returns of Small Firms
Banz (1981) and subsequently Reinganum (1981) and others document the
small-firm anomaly: Classifying all NYSE-traded stocks into five portfolios
based on stock market value, and using monthly returns over the period 1931—
1978, Keim (1983b, Table 2) reports that the annual average excess return of
the smallest quintile firms exceeds the annual average excess return of the
largest quintile firms by 16%. We argue that tax trading, not only fails to
explain the anomaly, but also casts doubts on Stoll and Whaley's (1983)
explanation which is based on transactions costs.
If tax trading is to explain the anomaly, we must identify some
characteristic of large firms which makes them better candidates for tax
trading than small firms. Variance of return is not the sought-after
characteristic. Small firms have higher variance of return than large
firms. Then the tax timing option is more valuable for small than for large
firms and the prediction is that small firms have lower before-tax mean return
20/—Alsothere are at least three pieces of empirical evidence which cast
doubtsona tax trading and/or transactions costs explanation of the size
anomaly. First, Brown, Kleidori and Marsh (1983) find that, although ranking
on firm size appears to produce excess returns inconsistent with the CAPM, the
sign of the excess returns is unstable over time. Second, Keim (1983a) finds
that nearly half of the excess returns are due to just the month of January.
Third, Chen (1983) finds that APT factor risk premia partly explain the
anomaly; and Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1983) find that macroeconomic variables
suggested by factor analysis and the APT partly explain the anomaly.28
than large firms. This argument not only fails to explain, but exacerbates
21/
the anomaly.
Relying on the differential transactions costs between small and large
firms,Stoll and Whaley (1983)claim to explain the anomaly. They compare the
before tax returns,net of transactions costs, of small and large firmslisted
on the NYSE.Theyfind that the abnormal returns of small firms become
statistically insignificant, provided that the round-triptransactions costs
are incurred at least annually, and interpret their findings as a resolution
of the anomaly. Whereas they explicitly incorporate transactions costs, they
omit from their calculations the perceived benefit which prompts investors to
trade despite the presence of these costs. If the rceived benefit from
trading in small firms is larger than the benefit from trading in large firms,
it maycompensatethe investor for the higher transactions costs associated
withsmall firms, thereby leaving the anomaly unexplained.
21/—Thefollowing (contrived) argument based on transactions costs may
explain the direction, but not the magnitude, of the anomaly. For small firms
transactions costs are large and investors follow the buy—and--hold policy.
For large firms taxable investors follow an active policy, taking advantage of
the distinction between the short term and the long term tax rates. With zero
transactions costs, after fifteen years of tax trading, the mean wealth ratio
under policy II and the buy—and-hold is 1.604 (see, Section 5.3 and Table
3). Effectively, the government subsidizes the investment in the stock of
large firms at the annual rate of (1/15)9n 1.604 =.032.No such subsidy
applies to the stock of small firms. Taxable investors bid up the stock
prices of large firms and, in equilibrium, the annual,after-tax mean return
ofsmall firms exceeds the mean return of large firms by 3.2%. Assuming 20%
capital gains tax, the before—tax difference in the mean returns is
3.2/.8 =4.0%.Thebenefitdisappears once we recognize that (1) for large
firms thevariance of stock return is below the average variance, (2) the
differential transactions costs are exaggerated, and (3)wemust follow a
tradingpolicy (e.g., policy III) to avoid the disadvantageous offsetting of
short term losses and long term gains.29
Toillustrate the point, consider the subset of trades generated by
22/
taxable investors following trading policy III (see, Section 5.4). We
capture the differential transactions costs between small and large firms by
assuming that the round—trip transactions costs rate is 4% for small firms and
zero for large firms. We also recognize the fact that the stock returns of
small firms are more variable than the stock returns of large firms. For high
variance stocks and 4% transactions costs, the mean wealth relative of policy
III and the buy-and-hold is 1.359 for medium variance stocks and zero
transactions costs, the mean wealth relative is very similar, being 1.383
(see, Table 3).Forsmall firms, the high variance of stock return
compensatesfor the high transactions costs. At least in this example, the
differential transactions costs fail to explain the small—firm anomaly.
6.2 The Abnormal JanuaryReturns
Wachtel (1942) and subsequently Dyl(1973), Officer (1975), Rozeff and
Kinney (1976), and others document the abnormally high January stock
returns. Dyl (1973) and Branch (1977) find positive abnormal returns for
stocks that have experienced losses during the previous year. Roll (1983)
finds that most of the abnormal returns occur on the last trading day of
December and the first four trading days of the following January. Also
22/
Wedo not claim that capital gains tax is the most important reason
for trading. In fact it is difficult to explain the observed volume of stock
trading without explicitly recognizing that agents are asymmetrically
informed. Glosten and Milgrom (1982) present a model of heterogeneously
informed traders to explain the bid-asked spread and the trading volume. The
price path is such that the uninformed traders' rate of return equals the
discount rate, if they hold the stock for T periods. Our point remains
valid in the context of their model also: The informed traders' rate of
return exceeds the discount rate. Also, an uninformed trader has an incentive
to hold the stock for longer than T periods and earn a rate of return higher
than the discount rate. This is so because there is no endogenous reason in
the model to sell the stock after T periods.30
Givolyand Ovadia (1983), Reinganum (1983) and Roll (1983) find that the
abnormalreturns of stocks, that have experienced losses during the previous
year, are substantially larger for small rather than large firms.
Several of these studies discuss tax-loss selling as a possible explanation of
the anomaly. Dyl (1973, 1977) finds abnormally low (high) December trading volume
for stocks that have appreciated (depreciated) during the year but correctly argues
that the volume seasonality does not imply a price seasonality, if the demand for
stocksis perfectly elastic. Gultekin and Gultekin (1982) and Korajczyk (1982)
study the seasonality in stock index returns in several countries, with widely
differing tax laws and tax year—end. With some reservations, Gultekin and Gultekin
(1982) interpret their findings as providing support for the tax—loss selling
hypothesis. Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) find that Australian stocks have
positive abnormal returns in January and July and, to a lesser degree, in December
and August, although the tax year—end in Australia is June 30. Also Berges,
McConnell and Schlarbaum (1982) find that Canadian stock have positive abnormal
January returns even before 1972, although capital gains were not taxed in Canada
before 1972.
Our contribution to this debate is to identify the critical assumptions in a
tax-related explanation of the seasonality in trading volume and stock prices. We
consider four scenarios with different assumptions on tax rates and transactions
costs.
In the first scenario there is no distinction between the short term and long
term tax rates, and transactions costs are zero. The investor optimally realizes a
loss whenever it occurs, arid defers gains. Even though taxes are paid only at year—
end, the investor realizes a loss immediately, lest the stock price rises and the
opportunity of taking the loss vanishes. This scenario does not predict an increase
in tax—loss selling at year-end.31
In the second scenario realized capital gains and losses are taxed at the lower
long term rate; long term gains do not offset short term losses dollar for dollar,
even if incurred in the same tax year; and transactions costs are zero. The
investor optimally realizes short term losses immediately, lest they becomelong
term or vanish. This scenario does not predict an increase in tax-loss selling at
year—end. The investor has an incentive to realize long term gains on medium and
highvariance stocks and reinstate the short term status. He also has an incentive
todefer the realizationof capital gains from the end of one year to the beginning
of the next one andsave the intereston the tax. This senario predicts decreased
tax-gainselling at the end of a year and increased tax-gain selling at the
beginning of a year. If the selling pressure were to depress the price, this
scenario would predict a negative abnormal January return for stocks that have had
gains during the previous year.
In the third scenario realized capital gains and losses are taxed at the lower
long term rate; long term gains offset short term losses dollar for dollar in the
same year; and transactions costs are zero. The optimal policy is complex but we
identify the relevant factors: The investor wishes to realize short term losses
immediately, lest they become long term or vanish. However, if he has already
realized large long term gains earlier in the year, he wishes to defer the short
term losses to the following year, if possible. The investor wishes to realize long
term gains on medium and high variance stocks, preferably at the beginning of the
followingyear. The important message is that none of these incentives predicts
increased tax—losssellingat year-end.
In the fourth scenario we assume that there is no distinction between the
shortterm and long term tax rates, but there are transactions costs. If
thereis no price seasonality, the investor realizes his losses by following a
control—limit policy, as in Figure 4. At the beginningof the year he is32
reluctant to incur the transactions costs and realize a small capital loss.
Towards the end of the year his reluctance is overcome by his preference for a
taxrebate this year rather than next year. This policy predicts that tax-
loss selling gradually increases from January to December and suddenlyceases
inthe first few days of January; realizing the loss at the end of December
dominates the realization of the same loss at the beginning of January.
An objection to the above argument is that, withoutthe distinction
between the short term and long term tax rates, transactions costs may
dissipatethe benefit of tax trading and the optimal policy may be to refrain
fromtax—loss selling. However, when we draw the distinction between the
short term and long term tax rates, our simulation demonstrates that
transactions costs do not significantly decrease the benefit from tax trading
(see, Table 3). The optimal trading policy becomes complex, but the essential
point remains that, with transactions costs, tax-loss selling gradually
increases from January to December and suddenly ceases in the first few days
of January.
The selling pressure may or may notaffect thestock price. The crucial
assumption is that, after selling the stock to realize a loss, investors do
notrepurchase the same stockorthe stock sold by other investors to realize
aloss. Then tax—loss selling depresses the price of stocks traded in
illiquid markets, such as the stocksofsmall firms.Withthe tax—loss
selling drying up at the beginning of January, the stocks experience positive
abnormal returns in January.
This explanation is subject to the criticism that otherwise sophisticated
tax—loss sellers are irrational or, at least, ignorant of the stock price
seasonality. Rational tax—losssellers should repurchase different stock sold
byother tax-loss sellers at about the same time. Effectively, pairs of tax-33
losssellers swap stocksand this activity does not depress the price of
either oneof the stocks.
Ifa tax—loss seller has a special reason (e.g., inside information) to
repurchase the same stock, he can wait at least one month before the
repurchase,and bypass the wash saleprovision. Being rational, he can modify
thetrading policy illustrated in Figure 4,accelerate tax—loss sales from
Decemberto the previous October or November, and thereby repurchase the stock
in time to receive the abnormal January returns. Alternatively, the investor
can change his tax year to end in a month other than December.
We conclude that tax—loss selling in the presence of transactions costs
predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume. It predicts a seasonal pattern
in stock prices only if we further assume irrationality or ignorance on behalf
of investors.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Tax trading does not explain the small—firmanomaly, but predicts a
seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock
prices, the January anomaly, only if we assume irrationality or ignorance on
behalf of investors. These results in no way detract from the basic message
of our theoretical calculations and simulation: For those investors who can
drawthe distinction between the short term and long term tax rates, the
benefit of optimal tax trading on medium and high variance stocks outweighs
evenlarge transactions costs.34
TABLE1
CRITICAL RATIOOFTHE LONG TERMTOTHE SHORT TERMTAX RATE BELOW WHICH
THEOPTIMAL POLICY IS TO REALIZE LONG TERM CAPITAL GAINS:



















































































































In parentheses the parameter u of the binomial process generating
annual prices. Theasteriskdenotes stocks for which the optimal policy is to
defer the realization of a long term gain when the price equals u times the
basis and T/t=.40.The dagger denotes stocks for which the optimal policy




CRITICALRATIO OF THE LONG TERM TOTHE SHORT TERM TAX RATE BELOW
WHICH THE OPTIMAL POLICY IS TOREALIZE LONG TERM CAPITAL GAINS:


















































































































The short term tax rate is 50%. In parenthesesthe parameter u of the
binomialprocess generating annual prices. The asterisk denotes stocks for
which the optimal policy is to defer the realization of a long term gain when
the price equals u times the basis and T/t= .40.36
TABLE3
WEALTH RELATIVES OF POLICIESI, II, III
ANDTHE BUY-AND-HOLD
HIGH VARIANCE MEDIUM VARIANCE LOW VARIANCE
(367stocks) (361stocks) (419stocks)
2y=02y =4%a 2y=02 = 21=o21=
POLICYI: REALIZE LOSSES IN EVERYDECEMBER AND DEFER GAINS.WEALTH
RELATIVES OFPOLICY I ANDBUY-AND-HOLD.
Mean 1.120 1.084 1.058 1.028 1.039 1.000
25 percentile 1.002 1.000 1.000 .990 1.000 .982
50 percentile 1.043 1.016 1.007 1.000 1.019 1.000
75 percentile 1.168 1.110 1.059 1.022 1.060 1.008
POLICY II: REALIZE GAINS ANDLOSSESIN EVERY DECEMBER.WEALTH RELATIVES
OFPOLICY II AND BUY-AND-HOLD.
Mean 2.242 1.720 1.604 1.224 1.381 1.050
25 percentile 1.521 1.188 1.296 .995 1.245 .957
50 percentile 1.966 1.521 1.468 1.109 1.323 1.008
75 percentile 2.651 2.050 1.694 1.293 1.445 1.095
POLICYIII: REALIZE GAINS IN ALTERNATE DECEMBERS AND REALIZE LOSSES
IN EVERY DECEMBER. WEALTH RELATIVES OF POLICY III AND
BUY-AND-HOLD.
Mean 1.7471.359 1.383 1.094 1.2751.011
25percentile 1.308 1.040 1.173 .964 1.176 .930
50percentile1.5471.214 1.3001.034 1.238 .982
75percentile 1.922 1.501 1.444 1.162 1.324 1.064
The marginal tax rate on ordinary income and on short term capital gains
and losses is 50%. The marginal tax rate on long term capital gains and
losses is 20%. The initial investment is made in December 1962 and the wealth
relatives are compared in December 1977.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE OPTIMALTRADING POLICYWITH ANNUALTAXATION OFCAPITALGAINS
ANDLOSSES,TRANSACTIONS COSTS ANDWITHOUTDISTINCTION







Jan. 1 Jan. 1
Defer gains and losses
Realize losses41
APPENDIX 1
Proof that V(P, P, t) is convex in P
Lemmas 1 and 2 lead to the main result, Lemma 3. Lemmas 1, 2, and 3
correspond to Merton's (1973b) Theorems 4, 9,- and 10.
LEMMA 1: V(P, P, t) is convex in P.
Proof: Consider two portfolios. Portfolio A consists of a shares with
A
price P per share, purchased at price p per share t periods ago; and
1 —ashares with price P per share, purchased at price P per share t
periods ago. We restrict a by 0 ( a '.1.The value of portfolio A is
aV(P, P, t) + (1 —a)V(P,P, t).
-
PortfolioB is simply one share with price P per share, purchased at
A
price aP + (1 —a)Pper share t periods ago.
If portfolio B is optimally liquidated at time T when the stock price
is P ,theafter—tax proceeds are(1 —
TL)PT
+ TL{aP + (1 —a)P}.At





+(1-a){(i - TL)PT+TL}and equal the after-tax
proceedsin liquidating portfolio B. Therefore the valueof portfolio A at
timet is at least as large as the value of portfolio B, i.e.,
aV(P, P, t) + (1 —a)V(P,P, t)V(P, aP +(1 —a)?,t)
LEMMA2:Assume that the distribution of the stock return, Tt' at time
t is independent of the price P. Then, V(P, P, t) is homogeneous of
degree one in (P, P), i.e., v(hP, hP, t) =hV(P,P, t), h > 0.
The proof is left to the reader.42
LEMMA 3:Assume that the distribution of the stock return is price—
A
independent.Then v(P, P, t) is convex in P.
Proof: For anyz, 0 ( a ( 1,
V(c&P + (1 —a)P',P, t)
aP + + (1 —a)P'(aP + (1- a)P') ,t)
(1—a)P' ciP +(1 —ct)P' +aP + (1 —)P'v(cLP+(1 —a)P',( ) p,t)
by the convexity of V in its second argument (see, Lemma1). We simplify
theright-hand side using thepropertythat V is homogeneous of degree one
inits first and second arguments (see, Lemma 2) and obtain
A
V(aP+ (1 —a)P',P, t)aV(P, P, t) + (1 -ci)V(P',P, t)43
APPENDIX 2
Determination of the function V(P, P) when the short term and long term tax
rates are equal.
We determine the functional form of V(P, P) in the case PP by
comparing twopositionsin the same stockbutwith different bases. Consider
two portfolios with the following composition:
First portfolio
A
(1) V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P) shares with basis P, PP.
A
(ii) A riskless, one-period bond with price R1[V(uP, P) -V(u1P,P)]V(uP, P).
Second portfolio
(i) V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P) shares with basis P, P .P.
(ii) A riskiess, one—period bond with price R1[V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P)]V(uP, P).
One period later, the stock price is either uP or u'1P. If the stock price
is uP,thefirst portfolio's value is
[V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P)]V(uP, P) + [V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P)]V(uP, )
andequals the second portfolio's value. If the stock price is u1P, the
first portfolio's value is
[V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P))V(u1P, P) + [V(uP, P) —V(u1P,P)]V(uP, P)
and again equals the second portfolio's value. Therefore, the investor is
indifferent between the two portfolios at the beginning of the period and we
obtain
[V(uP, P) -V(u1P,P)]v(P, P) ÷ R1[V(uP, P) -V(u1P,;)]V(uP, P)
=[V(uP,P) -V(u1P,)]V(P,P) + R1 [V(uP, P) -V(u1P,P) ]V(uP, P)Rearranging, we obtain
44
-u-R
Equations (6) and (2.2) imply 0 < k < 1.
We rewrite equation (2.1) as
V(P, 1') =R1((1-k)V(uP, )+kV(u1P,P)], P 'P
We interpret 1—k,kas the pseudoprobabilities of thetwo stateswhich
occurin the binomial process, as in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979).
Equation (2.3) has the following interpretation: V(P, P) is the expected
value of positions (uP, P) and (u1P, P) discounted by R, where the
expectation is with respect to the pseudoprobabilities 1 -kand kThe
actual probabilities 1 -q,q do not enter equation (2.3). The
corresponding result in the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes (1973)
isthat the option price is independent of the expected rate of return of the
underlying security.
We eliminate k fromequations (2.2)and (2.3) and obtain thedifference
equationin P
(2.4) V(P, P) =Rl[(RI
U
) V(uP, +(uflV(uP, P)], p
A A A A
V(P, P) —RV(uP,P)V(P, P) —RV(uP, P)- -1
(2.1) = = — Rk
V(uP,P) —V(uP V(uP, P) —V(u1P, )
wherek is a constant to be determined. Since the left-hand side is
A
independent of P and the right—hand side is independent of P, k is
independent of P. P. Since V(P, P) is homogeneous of degree one in (P,
P),it follows that V(P, 0) is homogeneous of degree one in P. Setting P





(2.5) v(P, P) =AP+BPm;lm p u1P
where
(2.6) m [Ln(u —R)—£n(UR—1)]/Znu< 0
It remains to determine the constants A and B. Using equation (7),
continuity of the function V at PP requires
AA A
(2.7) v(P, P) =P
and continuity at P =uP requires
1 AA is a
(2.8) V(u P, P) =(1—t)uP +TP
Theboundary conditions (2.7) and (2.8) uniquely determine the constants A and
B and we obtain equation (8).46
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